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COMMENTARY
Reliance on State Constitutions-Away
From a Reactionary Approacht
by RONALD K.L. COLLINS*
Introduction
There is a popular misconception that a case of constitutional di-
mension is not final until passed upon by the United States Supreme
Court.1 It is also commonly thought that in order for a doctrine of
constitutional law to prevail, it must at least be recognized somewhere
on the pages of the United States Reports. It should come as no sur-
prise, therefore, that it took a federal judge2 to remind the states of
what they once knew all too well; namely, that the state charters have
an important role to play in the constitutional process of American
government.3 In the four years since Justice William Brennan's article
was published, appellate courts in over fifteen states have cited it, and
t This commentary is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Kantilal Tuljashanker
Shukla (1922-81), who for over two decades made life possible and asked for very little
along the way. See M.K. GANDHI, DiscouRSEs ON THE GITA 18-19 (1960).
* B.A., J.D.; past Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School, and former Law Clerk to
Justice Hans A. Linde, Oregon Supreme Court. [Editor's note: After this commentary was
completed, the author was named a Judicial Fellow of the United States Supreme Court.]
1. But see Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590 (1875). See also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
2. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489 (1977). For an earlier statement to the same effect, see Brennan, Address to the
New Jersey Bar, 33 GUILD PRAC. 152 (1976).
3. For the purposes of this commentary, only civil rights and civil liberties issues relat-
ing to state constitutions are considered. More specifically, the discussion that follows con-
cerns questions pertaining to states' bills of rights. An equally and perhaps more important
side of state constitutional law concerns the structure of state government, home rule, taxing
and spending limitations, and so forth. Attention to these topics has also long been ne-
glected, thus preventing any real and broad reform movements at the state and local levels
of government. For a single illustration of the importance of these issues, consider the rela-
tively recent debate in Oregon concerning "home rule." See, e.ga, City of La Grande v.
Public Employees Retirement Bd., 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204 (1978), reaj'd on rehearing,
284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978).
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scores of law review authors representing no fewer than twenty-eight
states have followed suit.4 With increasing regularity, state ap pellate
court decisions are drawing upon his article, perhaps because of some
felt need to "legitimize" independent resort to state constitutions.
This rediscovery of state constitutions is certainly a good omen for
a nation conceived in federalism-particularly so since, as Justice
Brennan has also observed, "it is the state courts at all levels, not the
federal courts, that finally determine the overwhelming number of the
vital issues of life, liberty and property that trouble countless human
beings of this Nation every year."' 5 This new interest in state constitu-
tions was not spawned, however, by any enthusiasm in the system of
government ordained under the state charter. Rather, state law too
often drew attention simply because it could be used as a utilitarian
device for perpetuating the constitutional expansionism wrought by the
Warren Court.6 Unfortunately, too many courts and commentators
have brushed aside many of the core considerations that underlie con-
stitutionalism at the state level-this in their scurry to foil philosoph-
ically unaccommodating federal precedents.
The primary offenders here are those who view the state charter
solely in instrumentalist terms related to some particular social goal.
For them, the state bill of rights is little more than a handy grab bag
filled with a bevy of clauses that may be exploited in order to circum-
vent disfavored United States Supreme Court decisions. State supreme
courts ranging from Massachusetts to California, in cases varying from
capital punishment7 to land use,' have sometimes employed their state
4. See SHEPARD'S LAW REVIEW CITATIONS (1979 & Mar. 1981 Supp); note 9 infra.
5. Brennan, Introduction: Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Mountain, 10 SETON HALL
L. REV. xii (1979). Consider also the following statement: "The spotlight is often focused
upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Too often, Ithink, thatfocustendsto
divert attentionfrom the vital role ofthe state courts in the administration ofjustice. Actually
the composite work of the courts of the 50 states has greater significance in measuring how
well America attains the ideal of equal justice under law for all. It is important to stress that
the Supreme Court of the United States has power to review only those decisions of state
courts that rest on federal law. I suppose the state courts of all levels must annually hand
down literally millions of decisions that do not rest on federal law, yet determine vital issues
of life, liberty, and property of countless human beings of the nation. Indeed, the number of
state court decisions resting on federal law that have been granted review by the United
States Supreme Court has never reached 100 during any of my 18 terms. The overwhelming
number offinal and vital decisions upon which depend lIfe, liberty, and property thus are deci-
sions a/the state courts." Brennan, Justice Nathan L. Jacobs-Tributes From His Colleagues,
28 RUTGERS L. REv. 209, 210 (1974) (emphasis added).
6. See, e.g., Bice,Anderson andthe Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750, 766
(1972).
7. See, e.g., District Attorney v. Watson, 80 Mass. 2231, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981) (holding city zoning
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constitutions in a selective and simply reactionary manner in order to
obtain a desired objective. The legal literature is increasingly inun-
dated with writings urging the bar to make similar use of state char-
ters. 9
The idea that state charters should be employed on a principled or
doctrinal basis is, for the most part, foreign to many courts and com-
mentators presently advocating "independent" reliance on state consti-
tutions. Most recently, the editors of the Yale Law Journal have seen fit
to publish an essay essentially applauding this reactionary "tradition."
In this commentary, I have taken the liberty of scrutinizing certain ar-
guments contained in that essay because they represent, in large meas-
ure, much of the "thinking" currently fashionable in far too many legal
circles. This commentary hopes to alert those concerned with state
constitutionalism to several of the theoretical and practical reasons for
moving away from a reactionary or instrumentalist approach for reli-
ance on state constitutions.
I. Federal Law: The Motivating Factor for Reliance
on State Law
Mr. Steven Kamp, in his essay entitled Private Abridgment of
Speech and State Constitutions,'0 calls attention to the importance and
indispensable character of state constitutions as founts of individual
rights, particularly in the context of freedom of expression. Some three
decades ago, now Dean Monrad Paulsen, addressing the same general
topic, voiced a similar concern: "State constitutions furnish extensive
ordinance which had the effect of including substantial part of plaintiffs' land in a conserva-
tion district violative of "taking" provision of state constitution); Life of the Land v. Land
Use Comm'n, 623 P.2d 431 (Hawaii 1981); Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302
N.W.2d 146 (1980) (perse exclusion of mobile homes held to lack "reasonable basis"). Not
all of these decisions can be labeled "reactionary."
9. For a sampling of these writings, see Note, Commonwealth v. Richman: A States
Extension of Procedural Rights Beyond Supreme Court Requirements, 13 DUQ. L. REv. 577
(1975); Note, O/Laboratories and Liberties: State Court Protection and Civil Rights, 10 GA.
L. REV. 533 (1976); Note, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center Federalism and State Pro-
tection of Free Speech, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 805 (1980); Comment, Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 289 (1980); Note, The IndependentApplica-
tion ofState Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 MARQ. L. REv.
596 (1979); Comment, Camping on Adequate State Grounds California Ensures the Reality of
Constitutional Ideals, 9 Sw.U.L. REv. 1157 (1977); Note, Expanding Criminal Procedure
Rights Under State Constitutions, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 909 (1976); Comment, Freedom
of Expression: State Constitution Broadens Rights on Privatel Owned Property Beyond
Boundaries ofFederal Constitution, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 453 (1981). A more recent expres-
sion of this view appears in Kelman, Foreword- Rediscovering the State Constitutional Bill of
Rights, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 413 (1981).
10. 90 YALE L.J. 165 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kamp].
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and sometimes unequal material which can help in the protection of
human liberties. . . ." " Tofay, no less than in 1951, there remains a
need to understand the significance and role of the independent nature
of state constitutional decision making.
My quarrel with Mr. Kamp's essay is not with the desirability of
independent reliance on state charters. There is more at issue here-
that is, Mr. Kamp's apparent motivation for this reliance is, as it stands,
somewhat suspect. Specifically, he exhorts independent interpretation
of state constitutional guarantees protecting "public forum and can-
vassing rights from private abridgment"' 2 because of his displeasure
with the fact that the "Supreme Court has held that the First Amend-
ment has no role to play in this area."' 3 Accordingly, Mr. Kamp advo-
cates employment of state constitutional guarantees primarily as a
reactionary device to avoid, and thereby insulate state court decisions
from, the mandate of "unpopular" Supreme Court decisions. Phrased
another way, he is probing for "alternative method[s]' ' 4 in order to
secure an objective not presently available as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law."' It is this quest that leads him to suggest "independent"
reliance on state constitutions.
But let us assume, if only for the sake of discussion, that tomorrow
the spirit should move the justices to resurrect the reasoning employed
in Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Food Emplorees Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 16 Let us further assume that such a decision
11. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND.
L. REv. 620 (1951). This article is far too often overlooked, especially in contemporary
writings discussing the "new trend" in employing state constitutions. See, e.g., Kamp, supra
note 10, at 178 n.64. Another valuable but forgotten article discussing the importance of
state constitutional guarantees, including their respective freedom of expression provisions,
is that of Professor Robert Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Needfor
aRenaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. Rav. 125 (1969). For a worthwhile discussion of state constitu-
tional guarantees relating to freedom of speech, see Note, Freedom of Expression Under
State Constitutions, 20 STAN. L. REv. 318 (1968), cited in Kamp, supra note 10, at 178 n.64.
12. Kamp, supra note 10, at 165.
13. Id. at 172.
14. Id Compare Kamp, supra note 10, at 172 with note 38 infra.
15. It is precisely this reactionary approach to state constitutional decision making that
thwarts the formation of any truly independent doctrinal developments at the state level
There may, however, be instances where, conceivably, a state court ought to be able to apply
federal law in order to obtain a result different from that arrived at by a reviewing federal
court. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 479-89 (1981) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court has most recently com-
mented: "I don't think the purpose [for invoking the state constitution] is necessarily to just
disagree with the United States Supreme Court. I don't think that is a valid justification."
Collins & Welsh, An Interview with Stanley Mosk, W.L.J., Mar./Apr. 1981, at 8, coL 3. But
see note 24 infra.
16. 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (state trespass law could not be invoked to ban peaceful union
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had all the earmarks of an opinion destined to sustain the test of time,
and that all indications were that the Court would generously interpret
this precedent. Would reliance on the independent guarantees of the
various state constitutions then be of any less consequence? If the de-
sired objective may be secured at the federal level, then why resort to
state law? Unfortunately, Mr. Kamp leaves these questions essentially
unanswered.
Mr. Kamp makes only the naked assertion that "principles of fed-
eralism' 7 "dictate that the states enter and protect persons against pri-
vate abridgment.""8 There is certainly something to be said for such an
argument; however, Mr. Kamp does not set out exactly what that
"something" is. This omission cannot remain, I submit, without under-
mining the very foundations of an independent state constitutional ju-
risprudence. Upon examination, the federalism doctrine reveals
considerations of a different order and well beyond any reactionary
model of "independent" interpretation. When measured against these
and other considerations, Mr. Kamp's variation of independent inter-
pretation clearly misses the mark.
II. Federalism: Three Reasons for Rejecting
a Reactionary Approach
For the limited purposes of this commentary, federalism consider-
ations may be described generally by reference to at least three rudi-
mentary accounts. First, as seen from the state perspective, federalism
entails the notion that proper respect be accorded to state institutions
performing those separate functions associated with the concept of sov-
ereignty. 19 The state charter represents something of a manifesto of
that sovereignty. This understanding of federalism clashes with Mr.
Kamp's unstated, but implicit, premise that the state constitution takes
on meaning only when employed to respond to certain interpretations
of the Federal Constitution. It is incongruous to speak of "independ -'
ent" state constitutional protections when the latter depend for their
existence on what formulae are advanced by the federal judiciary,,
Stated otherwise, it is impossible for the corpus of law announced
under the state constitution ever to be truly independent and consistent
if resort to it is basically haphazard or assessed in instrumentalist
picketing of a shopping center supermarket in its adjacent parking lot). Logan Valley was
expressly overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
17. Kamp, supra note 10, at 182.
18. Id. at 177.
19. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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terms.2" If one were to turn simply to those decisions clearly grounded
in the state constitution-altogether ignoring parallel federal constitu-
tional precedents-what body of decisional law would there be that
interpreted state provisions? Although reactionary or selective ap-
proaches to state constitutional decision making may secure a particu-
lar desired result or may be tactically wise,2' these approaches do little,
if anything, to advance one concern of federalism-giving proper re-
spect to state institutions performing what are clearly separate and sov-
ereign state functions.22
Mr. Kamp's instrumentalist model is also difficult to reconcile with
that account of federalism which addresses the issue of whether or not
a state can deny a federally protected right without first determining if
under state law, including the state constitution, that right is secured.
Eleven years ago, one commentator explained this argument as follows:
The federal source of all "due process" and "equal protection"
attacks on state regulation is the fourteenth amendment's com-
mand that "No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to .any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Whether
this command has been violated depends on what the state has
finally done. Many low-level errors that potentially deny due
process or equal protection are corrected within the state court
system; that is what it is for. The state constitution is part of the
state law, and decisions applying it are part of the total state ac-
tion in a case. When the state court holds that a given state law,
regulation, ordinance, or official action is invalid and must be set
aside under the state constitution, then the state is not violating
the fourteenth amendment.23
20. See Porter, State Supreme Courts and the Legacy of the Warren Court: Some Old
Inquiriesfor a New Situation, 8 PUBLIUS 55 (1978).
21. See Linde, First Things First- Rediscovering The States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT.
L. Rnv. 379, 387-88 (1980) [hereinafter cited as First Things First]; Collins & Welsh, Calfor-
nia Constitution Turns Into a Political Toy, L.A. Times, July 17, 1980, pt. II, at 7, coL I;
Collins & Welsh, Picking and Choosing a Constitution, W.L.J., Mar./Apr. 1980, at 13, col 1.
See generally notes 40 & 47 infra.
22. That is, "if a state court undertakes to evolve an independent jurisprudence under
the state constitution, it must give as much attention and respect to the different constitu-
tional sources, and to striving for some continuity and consistency in their use, as we ask of
the United States Supreme Court justices .... This will not be accomplished by searching ad
hocfor some plausible premise in the state constitution onl, when federal precedents will not
support the desired result .... " Linde, Without "Due Process' Unconstitutional Law In
Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 146 (1970) (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 133. Continuing, Linde further explained: "The point is obvious when a
conclusion such as 'Regulation X denies defendant's rights under the fourteenth amendment
and the corresponding sections of Oregon constitution article I' is broken down into its com-
ponent parts. When a judgment holds with the defendant that the regulation is invalid
under the state constitution, it cannot move on to a second proposition invalidating the
[Vol. 9:1
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This account of federalism recognizes something of a jurisdictional
barrier which requires state courts to examine first state law and then, if
constitutionally necessary, proceed to Fourteenth Amendment consid-
erations. 4
The third account pertains to what Justice Stanley Mosk of the
California Supreme Court labels as "the ability of the states to innovate
and to create new bodies of law, and to experiment. 25 This argument
recognizes the importance of experimentation at the state level in order
to best obtain the particular objectives outlined in the state charter, or
in order to rely upon a preferred jurisprudence for applying the law of
the state. In interpreting their own charters, state courts need not only
apply differently those federal standards incorporated into their consti-
tutions, but more importantly, may announce their own original stan-
state's action under the federal Constitution. By the action of the state court under the state
constitution, the state has accorded the claimant the due process and equal protection com-
manded by the fourteenth amendment, not denied it." Id. Similar statements may be found
in First Things First, supra note 21, at 3 83-84; Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradi-
tion, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 250 (1972); Kipling, A Talk With Justice Linde, W.L.J., Mar./Apr.
1980, at I, col. 1; Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REv. 325, 339 (1973). See also Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 729 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[U]nless it is quite clear that the
state court has resolved all applicable state-law questions adversely to the defendant and
that it feels compelled by its view of the federal constitutional issue to reverse the conviction
at hand," the Supreme Court should decline to reverse the state court's ruling in favor of the
rights claimant). Compare Linde, supra, with Bice, supra note 6, at 753-54: "[S]tate court
refusals to reach federal issues, either at trial or on appeal, are the most likely manifestation
of discriminatory purpose. . . ." and with Kelman, supra note 9, at 428-31 (premising his
arguments on a "broader rights" view of state constitutions).
24. This is a well-settled rule of law in Oregon. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 291 Or. 201,
630 P.2d 810 (1981); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981); State v.
Scharf, 288 Or. 451, 454-55, 605 P.2d 690, 691 (1980); State v. Spada, 286 Or. 305, 309, 594
P.2d 815, 817 (1979); State v. Smyth, 286 Or. 293, 297, 593 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1979). At least a
handful of state supreme courts, however, have overlooked this argument and have em-
ployed a different approach. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 192, 622 P.2d
1199, 1212-13 (1980) (Utter, C.J., concurring); Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 454 (Alaska
1980) argued, 50 U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1981); People v. Holcomb, 395 Mich. 326, 330
n.2, 235 N.W.2d 343, 344 n.2 (1975). See also Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachu-
setts Declaration ofRights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution,
14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 887, 889 (1980) (Justice Wilkins of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts discussing instances in which it is "superfluous to determine state constitu-
tional principles"); Collins & Welsh, supra note 15. "[T]o a certain extent we have to see
what the minimum is first, and then we look to our state constitution and our state statutes to
see if greater protection is provided under state law, in which case we give the greater protec-
tion." Id. at 8, cols. 3-4. But cf. People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 248, 578 P.2d 108, 118,
145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 871 (1978) (per Mosk, J.)(" '[O]ur first referent is to California law' ").
25. Collins & Welsh, Portions of Unpublished Interview with Justice Stanley Mosk
(San Francisco, Calif., Jan. 24, 1981). See also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Douglas, State JudicialActivism-The New Rolefor
State Bills ofRihts, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 1136-39 (1978).
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dards.26 Thus, state courts whose constitutions so permit have the
opportunity to consider anew a jurisprudence of freedom of speech,27
or they may want to think through the wisdom of employing the "ra-
tionality" analysis presently in vogue in the federal courts. 28 In the
criminal procedure context, state judges, by relying on their state con-
stitutions, could reformulate the law of confessions or rearticulate the
constitutional premises underlying the exclusionary rule.29  The pos-
sibilities are almost endless. State courts and commentators, however,
with their eyes set on the workings of the Supreme Court,30 have never-
theless made little progress toward this end.
26. Justice Charles Douglas of the New Hampshire Supreme Court has spoken to this
general point: "State judges turn out decisions that increasingly mirror the federal cases.
Their state bills of rights have atrophied in the process of keeping up with the latest five-to-
four decision out of Washington. Intellectual challenge declines because it is easier for most
law clerks and judges to look first to the federal cases." Douglas, supra note 25, at 1137.
Even so, there is some evidence that state courts are beginning to realize the point made
in the text. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 291 Or. 201, 630 P.2d 810 (1981) (sketching out the
contours of the state privileges or immunities clapse); Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448
(Alaska 1980), argued, 50 U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1981) ("two-tier" equal protection
analysis abandoned in favor of employing an "intermediate" approach); Hawkins v. Supe-
rior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978) (Mosk, J., separately
concurring) (abandoning "two-tier" equal protection analysis and instead employing an "in-
termediate" approach); Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or. 75, 619 P.2d 632 (1980)(rejecting "balanc-
ing" formula employed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)). See generally People v.
Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 253-54, 578 P.2d 108, 122, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 875 (1978) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Linde, "Clear & Present Danger" Reexamined- Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN L. REV. 1163, 1174-83 (1970); Baker, Press Rzghts and Gov-
ernment Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1980). Here one must, of
course, be particularly mindful of the different wording of the state freedom of expression
provisions. See Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriouso -. THE CENTER MAGA-
ZINE, Sept./Oct. 1981, at 6 (comparing various freedom of expression provisions).
28. See, e.g., Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1
(1980); Michelman, Politics and Values or What'r Really Wrong With Rationality Review, 13
CREIGHTON L. REv. 487 (1979); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197
(1976). See also Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal
Protection, 58 TEX. L. REv. 1029 (1980).
29. See, e.g., Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION & CONFESSIONS 41-76 (1980);
Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1978); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974). There is also the matter of the
differing nature of a state court's supervisory powers. See, e.g., Howard, State Courts and
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 907 (1976).
30. Another point to consider is exactly how much guidance the United States Supreme
Court presently gives the states in the area of constitutional law. See Note, Plurality Deci-
sions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1127 (1981). Professor A.E. Dick
Howard noted: "They're making decisions on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis, so we're
likely to see this crazy quilt pattern of rulings continue." Gest, Supreme Court Steps Back
From Activism, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 13, 1981, at 52. See also O'Connor, Trends
in the Relationshp Between the Federal & State Courts From the Perspective ofa State Judge,
22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 804 (1981). So understood, it would be desirable for "in-
[Vol. 9:1
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Seen against this backdrop, it matters little, if at all, whether Logan
Valley is the established federal law, so long as the states do not dimin-
ish federally protected rights. What does matter, in terms of federal-
ism, is that independent interpretation at the state level be associated
with fundamental jurisprudential concerns which transcend mere reac-
tionary motivations.
III. A Few Additional Reasons for Rejecting
a Reactionary Approach
Mr. Kamp additionally overlooks other important considerations
in his rush to circumvent federal law in the hope of "protecti[ng]...
public forum and canvassing rights from private abridgment."' 3 ' In his
analysis of the decision in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,32 Mr.
Kamp takes fundamentally the same approach as did the California
Supreme Court.33 Both claims are, from a state constitutional vantage
point, one-sided. Recall that the United States Supreme Court, like the
California Supreme Court, considered only the federal constitutional
property and speech rights of the shopping center owners. In his hurry
to invoke state constitutional "protections" providing access to shop-
ping centers, Mr. Kamp skips over the possibility that the relief sought
by the shopping center owners may indeed still be available to them as
a matter of state law. What about article I, section 1 of the California
Constitution, which lists among the "inalienable rights" those associ-
ated with "protecting property"? Or what about clauses which on their
face or by interpretation may prohibit access to privately owned shop-
ping centers or require that 'just compensation" be paid for such ac-
cess?34 These are considerations of state constitutional law that Mr.
dependent-minded state courts [to] engage in zero-based state interpretation," contrary to
what Professor Kelman suggests. See Kelman, supra note 9, at 429.
31. Kamp, supra note 10, at 165.
32. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
33. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 41, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979), affd sub nom., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See
Welsh & Collins, Pruneyard-Looking at the New Federalism, W.L.J., Jul./Aug. 1980, at 13,
col. I.
34. Consider, for example, article I, section 15 of the Illinois Constitution, which pro-
vides: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compen-
sation as provided by law. Such compensation shall be determined by a jury as provided by
law." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15. See also LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (see Hargrave, The Declaration
of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REv. 1, 10-20 (1974)); MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 13; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 26; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (see I HOWARD, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTrruTION OF VIRGINIA 210-29 (1974)). For an interesting judicial
examination of such provisions, see Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981)
(holding city zoning ordinance which had the effect of including substantial part of plain-
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Kamp does not pause to explore. A reactionary or result-oriented view
of independent interpretation at the state level necessarily puts aside
such considerations. Independent interpretation, as a matter of consti-
tutional principle, must be a two-way street.
Mr. Kamp correctly points out that "[m]ost courts have simply as-
sumed that the state guarantee was to be construed inparimateria with
the first Amendment."35 Ironically, this occurs in many state appellate
courts despite the differences in both history3 6 and text3 7 between the
tiffs' land in a conservation district violative of "taking" provision of state constitution);
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Trussell, 247 Ga. 148. 273 S.E.2d 859 (1981)
("damage" clause 6f state constitution gives injured citizen a constitutional cause of action
against a public authority for injury to his property interests regardless of whether there is
also a "taking"). Ironically, the California Supreme Court has yet to pass on this issue, even
though it was presented to it in the Pruneyard briefs. See CAL. CONST., art. I, §§ 1, 19. But
e State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615, 629 (1980),juris. postponed, 101 S.Ct. 2312
(1981) (allowing distribution of political literature on private campus under free speech
clause of state charter and also finding no violation of federal or state property rights).
35. Kamp, supra note 10, at 178 n.64, 181.
36. In this regard, Mr. Kamp makes the following statement: "Moreover, the language
and history of the state constitutional guarantees of free speech and related rights of expres-
sion indicate that they provide protection for public forum and canvassing rights against
private abridgment." Id. at 178-79.
On this point, one will look in vain to find any historical discussions of state constitu-
tions beyond Mr. Kamp's passing footnote references to the California and Michigan consti-
tutions. See id. at 179 n.70. Yet the significance of historical information as an aid in
construing state constitutions cannot at this time be understated. Relatively little has been
done in this area. For some general source materials, see W.P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONS (1980); 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS 72-172 (1927); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN L xw 100-09 (1973); H.
HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1776-1826, at 113-20
(1939); A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA (1975); A. How-
ARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 203-15 (1968); A. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 106-17 (1935); 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 179-379 (1971); W. SWINDLER, SOURCES & DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS (1977) (10 vols.); Black, The Formation of the First State
Constitutions, 7 CONST. REV. 22 (1923); David, Our California Constitutions: Retrospections
in This Bicentennial Year, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 697 (1976); Dubauld, State Precedents
for the Bill of Rights, 7 J. PUB. L. 323 (1958); Graham, The Earhy State Constitutions, 9
CONST. REV. 222 (1925); Howard, "For the Common Benft" Constitutional History in Vir-
ginia as a Casebookfor the Modern Constitution-Maker, 54 VA. L. REV. 816 (1968); Nelson,
Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the
States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166 (1972). Equally, if not more helpful sources for
discerning historical intent are the records and proceedings of the debates of the constitu-
tional conventions of the respective states. See also A. NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES
DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1798 (1924).
37. On this point, Mr. Kamp correctly points out that "[t]he free speech guarantees in
[most of the] state constitutions create an affirmative right of free speech, unlike the mere
limitation on state action found in the First Amendment." Kamp, supra note 10, at 179
(footnote omitted). One wishes that Mr. Kamp had further expounded on the implications
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federal and state charters38 -differences to which Mr. Kamp gives ei-
of this point so far as it concerns the "system of freedom of expression" at the state level. Id.
at 178.
There are many avenues open for exploration when it comes to textual and structural
interpretations of state charters. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777
(1979), in which the Oregon Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether or not the
state constitution permitted an award of punitive damages for defamation. Speaking for an
undivided court, Justice Lent stated: "Article I, § 8 of the Oregon Constitution provides:
'No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall be responsible
for the abuse of this right.' Unlike the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, it does not mention separately the 'freedom of the press' and so does not provide
support for any distinction between private individuals and members of the media.
"Defamatory statements, of course, have throughout the history of this state been recog-
nized as an abuse of the right of free expression for which a person is to be held responsible
under the provisions of Article I, § 8. However, when we consider the ways in which a
person may be held responsible in a civil action for defamatory speech or writing, we must
also consider the provisions of Article I, § 10, which guarantees every person a remedy 'by
due course oflaw for injury done him in his.., reputation.' Construing together these two
provisions of Article I, both of which have a direct bearing on defamation cases, we hold
that in a common-law civil action for damages, the defendant who has abused the right of
free expression by defamatory statements may be held responsible only to the extent of
permitting the injured party to recover for the resulting injury to reputation-that is, to
recover compensatory damages." 286 Or. at 117-18, 593 P.2d at 788 (emphasis added).
"Due course of law" is not to be confused with provisions such as "dueprocess of law" that
are contained in the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Stroup, 290 Or. 185, 200, 620
P.2d 1359, 1368 (1980); Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49
OR. L. REv. 125, 145-46 (1970).
38. Textual differences are again alerting some state judges to the need to invoke consti-
tutional considerations different from those to which the Federal Constitution gives rise.
See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981) (applying "unnecessary rigor"
provision of state constitution to treatment of prisoners); State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, 630
P.2d 824 (1981); State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d 94 (1980) (statute prohibiting posses-
sion of a "billy" held contrary to state constitutional right of "the people. . . to bear arms
for the defense of themselves"); State ex rel Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277,
613 P.2d 23 (1980) ("justice shall be administered openly" provision of state constitution
held to permit access of newspaper reporters to juvenile court hearing); State v. Greene, 285
Or. 337, 347, 591 P.2d 1362, 1367 (1979) (Linde, J., concurring) (arguing that under the state
constitution, "a search or seizure is supposed to be authorized and governed by law before a
question arises whether that law authorized something that the constitution forbids"); Da-
vidson v. Rogers, 281 Or. 219, 222, 574 P.2d 624, 625 (1978) (Linde, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing state constitutional provision allowing for a "remedy by due course of law for injury
done [one] in his person, property, or reputation"); Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah
1980) (compelled handwriting sample held to be violative of state constitutional provision
prohibiting the state from compelling a person "to give evidence against himself"); State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (privacy provision in state charter held to
require "automatic standing principle" in search and seizure context); Federated Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 68, 615 P.2d 440, 449 (1980) (Dolliver, J., dissenting)
(public right of access to pretrial hearing); State ex rel Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267
S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1980) ("Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise
provided, shall be by a jury of twelve men, public.. . ." state constitutional provision,
when read in light of "courts of this State shall be open" state constitutional clause, held to
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ther no serious attention or only rhetorical reference. What about
courts which adopt Mr. Kamp's view but do so by relying on both fed-
eral and state grounds39 in order to obtain an "independently"
grounded decision vis-A-vis an analysis of federal precedents?40 Here
the issue is how and when such federal precedents are incorporated
into the state constitutional law without doing violence to the notion of
truly independent state constitutional decision making.4 Consider in
this respect Jacoby v. State Bar,42 a case concerning the validity of a
proscription against certain types of attorney advertising. While the
California Supreme Court declared that the state constitutional "provi-
sion is 'more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment,' -43 it
added that "although for convenience we frequently refer throughout
this opinion to the First Amendment, we base our decision equally on
the terms of the state Constitution."" Thereafter, the court in Jacoby
proceeded to "analyze petitioners' contentions in terms of general First
Amendment law."'45 Does that mean that all of the federal cases pri-
marily relied upon or discussed were thereby incorporated into the law
under the state constitution? If not, what is the decisional basis46 of the
guarantee public and press access to pretrial hearings). Accord, State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or.
835, 845, 618 P.2d 423, 435 (1980) (Linde, J., dissenting) (wildlife preserve "checkpoint"
stops). See also Hargrave, The Declaration ofRights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
LA. L. REV. 1, 6-10, 20-25, 35-40, 62-65 (1974); Force, supra note 11, at 141-42. Consistent
with the position advanced in this commentary, decisions like the above-mentioned ones
take on meaning at the state level, in terms of formulating a corpus of law, onl, when resort
to the state constitution is the rule and not an "alternative method" (Kamp, supra note 10, at
172) for skirting federal law.
39. Consider Bice, supra note 6, at 756-58.
40. Too frequently, state courts, in invoking state and federal guarantees, "fail to distin-
guish between them and they have [therefore] become almost interchangeable. By deciding
cases on the basis of federal constitutional provisions raised in the pleadings, and by failing
to discuss possible differences between state and federal safeguards, state courts have con-
tributed to the diminishing importance of state constitutional protection for civil liberties."
Note, Freedom of Expression Under State Constitutions, supra note 11, at 326-27 (footnote
omitted). For an example of one variation of this, see People v. Level, 103 Cal. App. 3d 899,
162 Cal. Rptr. 682,judgment vacated & remanded, 449 U.S. 945 (1980). revtd 117 Cal. App.
3d 462, 172 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1981). See also People v. Plantefaber, 410 Mich. 594, 302
N.W.2d 557 (1981) (mere footnote reference to state charter followed by exclusive discussion
of federal law); note 47 infra.
41. See First Things First, supra note 21, at 394.
42. 19 Cal. 3d 359, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977).
43. 19 Cal. 3d at 363 n.2, 562 P.2d at 1329 n.2, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.2 (quoting Wilson
v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975)).
44. Id.
45. 19 Cal. 3d at 368, 562 P.2d at 1332, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
46. This is not to say that judicial holdings must always be grounded in decisional law,
but only that the holding be grounded in law. See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 613 n.1,
625 P.2d 123, 126 n.1 (1981). Somehow, far too many attorneys assume that the absence of
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court's holding insofar as the state constitution is concerned? Must a
state court, particularly in light of Delaware v. Prouse,47 be explicit in
declaring that it is employing federal law for illustrative purposes only
and does not intend to adopt the federal standards part and parcel?
An instrumentalist approach to decision making does not provide
the necessary decisional framework in which to determine questions of
consistency and uniformity. Similarly, it provides no decisional plat-
form upon which to develop a jurisprudence adaptable to the law of the
state. Instead, a reactionary approach uses the state charter in a piece-
meal fashion, whenever the occasion may arise-in the minds of the
judges-for purposes of philosophical disagreement or in order to insu-
decisional law is tantamount to the absence of law--this notwithstanding the command of a
rule, regulation, city charter provision or ordinance, statute, or state constitutional provision.
Hence, attorneys quite regularly feel compelled to draw upon federal decisional law when
state appellate courts have not rendered opinions interpreting the state constitution. Of
course, decisional law is at best but one guide.
47. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Speaking for the Court, Justice White declared: "Because the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the stop at issue not only violated the Federal Constitu-
tion but was also impermissible under Art. I, § 6, of the Delaware Constitution, it is urged
that the judgment below was based on an independent and adequate state ground and that
we therefore have no jurisdiction in this case. At least, it is suggested, the matter is suffi-
ciently uncertain that we should remand for clarification as to the ground upon which the
judgment rested. Based on our reading of the opinion, however, we are satisfied that even if
the state Constitution would have provided an adequate basis for the judgment, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court did not intend to rest its decision independently on the state Constitu-
tion and that we have jurisdiction of this case.
"As we understand the opinion below, Art I, § 6, of the Delaware Constitution will
automatically be interpreted at least as broadly as the Fourth Amendment; that is, every
police practice authoritatively determined to be contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments will, without further analysis, be held to be contrary to Art I, § 6. This ap-
proach, which is consistent with previous opinions of the Delaware Supreme Court, was
followed in this case. The court analyzed the various decisions interpreting the Federal Consti-
tution, concluded that the Fourth Amendmentforeclosed spot checks of automobiles, and sum-
marily held that the state Constitution was therefore also infringed. This is one of those cases
where 'at the very least, the [state] court felt compelled by what it understood to be federal
constitutional considerations to construe. . . its own law in the manner it did.' Had state
law not been mentioned at all, there would be no question about our jurisdiction, even
though the state Constitution might have provided an independent and adequate state
ground. The same result should follow here where the state constitutional holding depended
upon the state court's view of the reach of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. If the
state court misapprehended federal law, 'lilt should be freed to decide . . . these suits ac-
cording to its own local law."' 440 U.S. at 651-53 (footnotes and citations omitted) (empha-
sis added). This pronouncement is certainly a signal to the states that mere citation to the
state charter may not be sufficient to establish an independent state constitutional basis for
the state decision. See generally Collins & Welsh, supra note 15, at 8, col. 3. Worse yet are
mere references to "state cases" as a basis for reliance on the state constitution. See, e.g.,
People v. Level, 103 Cal. App. 3d 899, 162 Cal. Rptr. 682,judgment vacated and remanded,
449 U.S. 945 (1980), rev'd, 117 Cal. App. 3d 462, 172 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1981). See also note 40
supra.
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late a controversial decision from Supreme Court review. Seen in this
light, the sovereign law of the state constitution becomes little more
than a plaything. Couched differently, "freedom of expression" clauses
like those in the previous charters are not instrumental in developing a
jurisprudence of freedom of expression as a matter of state law, but
rather these and other clauses are understood as being instrumental in
securing a particularpolitical objective in a particular controversy-in
Mr. Kamp's case, that of "public forum and canvassing rights." When
this occurs, the state constitution ceases to be the legal touchstone. The
conceptual link between the clauses and the constitution is thus sev-
ered. In that regard, Mr. Kamp and those who subscribe to his position
would do well to consider the following: "[W]hat is instrumental can-
not endure in the absence of that to which it is instrumental."48
Reactionary use of the state constitution perpetuates another evil.
It invites state judges to take theirfirst constitutional cue from what the
United States Supreme Court says about the Federal Constitution, de-
spite the fact that it is the state constitution they are being called upon
to interpret. This is a surprising phenomenon since in areas of private
law such as torts, landlord-tenant or contracts, state courts often con-
sider the decisional law of other states. After the emergence of the
Warren Court, this no longer holds true in the area of constitutional
law. Thus, "while state courts routinely assume their charge to declare
individual rights against other individuals or private entities, the curi-
ous fact is that they seldom and hesitantly assume the same responsibil-
ity for indiiidual rights against public authority. ' 49 In developing truly
independent bodies of state constitutional law, state courts may well be
better served5" by devoting more attention to considering what their
sister courts have done in interpreting perhaps identical provisions in
their charters-this after examining questions of constitutional text,
48. H. JAFFA, THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 227 (1975).
49. First Things First, supra note 21, at 380. See Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66
MINN. L. REV. 171, 177 (1981).
50. Political scientists G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Porter have discussed in this
regard what they label as "patterns of reciprocal influence," which they describe as follows:
"Vertical Federalism: State supreme court participation in the vertical process of feder-
alism is demonstrated by their development of Federal constitutional law in five distinguish-
able, but not altogether unrelated, ways:
"First, since state courts as well as federal courts are obliged to enforce the U.S. Consti-
tution, and since such a miniscule percentage of the constitutional rulings of state supreme
courts are reviewed by the highest Federal tribunal, state supreme courts make both a quali-
tatively and quantitatively impressive contribution to the corpus of Federal constitutional
law.
"Second, state high courts rather directly influence the fashioning of Federal constitu-
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structure and history.5
The underlying premise of the immediately preceding remarks
suggests another fallacy in the instrumentalist brand of logic advanced
in Mr. Kamp's essay. The argument restates the oft-quoted maxim that
provides that states are free under their own. law to extend "greater
[constitutional] protection '52 whenever they perceive the need. In a
sense, the oft-quoted maxim is wrong, if only because it is unduly sim-
plistic. It is erroneous because states may certainly extend an equal
measure of constitutional protection under their state charters, though
they may do so for different reasons. More importantly, there is no
constitutional impediment preventing state courts from granting a
lesser degree of protection under state law, provided only that these
courts then proceed to apply the command of the Federal Constitution
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. In other words, the
logic of principled interpretation at the state level, being other than
reactionary oriented, demands that any given argument be tested on its
own merits independently of what level of constitutional protection
could result. In some instances, it may well be that the logical scope of
a state constitutional premise does not extend so far as to afford an
equivalent or greater measure of protection than that allotted under the
Bill of Rights.
A few examples may help clarify the point. Assume that a given
state has in its charter a bill of rights similar to the federal one.
Thoughtful state judges so situated might find themselves hard pressed
to accept the "right of privacy" arguments advanced in Griswold v. Con-
tional law by lighting the way for the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, the Supreme Court may
postpone tackling certain issues until it has a body of cases upon which to draw ...
"Less directly, state justices formulate or-more accurately-engender constitutional
law through their responses to U.S. Supreme Court rulings ...
"Finally, by making their own uses of Supreme Court decisions, state supreme courts
serve as repositories of constitutional law ...
"Horizontal Federalism: [I]nteractions among the American states are an equally im-
portant component of the federal relationships and contribute to policy development
throughout the states. ....
"State supreme courts' relatively rapid adoption of similar policies pertaining to school
finance and automobile guest statutes. . . indicates that interstate influences are vital in the
development of public and private law." Tarr & Porter, State Supreme Court Policymaking
and Federalism, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(Porter & Tarr eds. 1981).
51. It would be helpful indeed if the editors of the American Political Science Review
resumed their past practice of having noted scholars author a yearly summary of develop-
ments in state constitutional law. See, e.g., Grant, State Constitutional Law in 1935-36, 30
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 692 (1936).
52. Kamp, supra note 10, at 174.
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necticut 53 and its progeny,5 4 or they may be unpersuaded by the argu-
ments relied upon by a majority of the Court in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia55 for constitutionally allowing access to the courts.5 6
Considerations of text, logic, history and consistency may prompt these
judges to reject these federally protected "rights," but only as questions
of state law. These federal "rights" would not suffer in that the same
state judges would then have to yield to the dictates of federal law and
acknowledge the claims presented. Accordingly, the constitutional
premises upon which the state law is grounded would not be sacrificed
merely because federal decisional law pointed in another direction.
Throughout this commentary I have been critical of the notion of
turning to state constitutions simply as, using Mr. Kamp's words, "al-
ternative method[s] '" 57 for obtaining a given objective. In actuality, this'
approach produces a handful of state constitutional decisions that are
no more than aberrations, linked neither in logic nor in precedent to
any sustaining corpus of state law. What this means, if anything, at the
educational level is that students are instructed to "see also" the deci-
sion of state X which may have rejected, for example, the holding of
Hudgens v. NLRB.58 So understood, the reactionary approach is per-
petuated-this at the expense of undermining the jurisprudential sig-
nificance of state constitutional law. Education in the sovereign law of
the state concerning the independent rights and liberties of its inhabit-
ants deserves more than such cursory attention. As Professor William
Swindler put it, state constitutional law must cease to be a "chronically
neglected subject."59
Among the fifty states, there is today an unhealthy kind of atten-
tion given to the decisions rendered by the United States Supreme
53. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
54. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 679 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
55. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
56. For a discussion of the court access provisions found in a number of state charters,
see Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, THE CENTER MAGAZINE,
Sept./Oct. 1981, at 6.
57. Kamp, supra note 10, at 172.
58. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Consider in this respect the following complaint by Justice
Douglas of the New Hampshire Supreme Court: "The fact that law clerks working for state
judges have only been taught or are familiar with federal cases brings a federal bias to the
various states as they fan out after graduation from 'federally' oriented law schools. The
lack of treatises or textbooks developing the rich diversity of state constitutional law devel-
opments could be viewed as an attempt to 'nationalize' the law and denigrate the state
bench." Douglas, supra note 25, at 1147 (footnote omitted & emphasis in original).
59. Swindler, State ConstitutionalLaw: Some Representative Decisions, 9 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 166 (1967).
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Court. In part, that attention has itself engendered the move towards a
reactionary "jurisprudence." So prevalent is this attitude that some
state judges, in response to the reactionary motivations of their col-
leagues, deem it necessary to formulate "criteria"6 to justify independ-
ent resort to their own constitutions. 61 Of still greater concern is the
resulting effect that a reactionary approach produces in the political
arena, where the possibility of amending the state charter looms ever
large. Where resort to the state constitution is a selective, issue-by-is-
sue process, it will come as little surprise when the public manifests its
outrage, backed by its amendment muscle,62 at novel state constitu-
60. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 200-02, 622 P.2d 1199, 1217 (1980)
(Horowitz, J., dissenting). The attorney general of California has, perhaps disingenuously,
advocated similar "criteria." Deukmejian & Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-Judi-
cial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 987-96 (1979).
But see Collins & Welsh, Caifornia Constitution Turns into a Political Toy, supra note 21,
noting: "Deukmejian, writing recently in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, took
note of the court's independence from both Washington and Sacramento, a situation that he
traced to 'result-oriented' decision-making in criminal justice cases. But politics, rather than
legal principle, is behind Deukmejian's insistence that the court establish a 'principled basis
for repudiating federal precedent' before considering reliance on the state Constitution. He
himself does not abide by that policy in his own office. For example, in his novel Los Ange-
les school violence lawsuit, Deukmejian is quick to invoke state constitutional law. The suit
is replete with claims that many observers believe are unlikely to be sustained under federal
law. Like the state Supreme Court justices he criticizes, Deukmejian is willing to acknowl-
edge the independent status of California's Constitution only when it suits him." Id. at 7,
col. 1.
Other "criteria" for resort to one body of law or another are sometimes employed.
Consider Justice Mosk's explanation of why the California Supreme Court relied upon fed-
eral law-despite briefing on the state law-in the noted Bakke case: "That was done delib-
erately. We discussed state issues and we could have insulated our opinion from federal
review by relying on state grounds, but upon reflection we believed that the issue was of
national significance and, therefore, calculatingly prepared the opinion with a view to its
being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court. If they had denied certiorari, they would have
given us a clear message. Since they took it over, they reached their conclusion; our opinion
was written deliberately for that purpose. Normally, we would have used the state constitu-
tion, but we deliberately chose not to because we had before us an issue of national import,
affecting parties and institutions beyond the borders of our state." Collins & Welsh, supra
note 15, at 10, col. 2.
61. In critical response to the widespread hesitation of state judges to make independent
use of their charters, one state supreme court justice has said: "I urge my brother state
judges to use initiative in looking up provisions of the respective state constitutions, constru-
ing and applying them to the facts at hand and only then turning to the federal cases. To do
so will get our product back on the market and lessen our role as mere distributors of the
federal product. It is easier for law clerks, academics and judges to palm off the federal
product as if it were a monopoly market with direction from corporate headquarters in
Washington. By dusting off our state constitutions, judges can be 'activists' in the best sense
of the word and breathe life into the fifty documents. If we let them atrophy in our respec-
tive states, we will not only have failed to live up to our oaths to defend those constitutions
but will have helped to destroy federalism as well." Douglas, supra note 25, at 1150.
62. Consider, for example, the constitutional havoc presently occurring in California as
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tional decisions.6 3 It is time to lay to rest the notion that state constitu-
tions are, in the political scheme of things, nothing but convenient
escape hatches. This holds true even in the sensitive area of freedom of
expression. For the reasons outlined above,64 state courts should look
first to their own laws, and in that regard downplay their concern about
"the ebb and flow of opinions on the Potomac." 65
Conclusion
If state constitutional law is ever to attain its deserved place in
American jurisprudence, resort to the various and varying state char-
ters must become something more than a mere "shell game."6 6 This is
no less the case when it comes to questions of protecting "public forum
and canvassing rights from private abridgment. 67  The process
certain political forces seek to push through a state constitutional amendment that would
curtail independent use of the state charter. Compare Van de Kamp, Shutting an Overused
Trap Door, L.A. Times, July 5, 1981, pt. IV, at 5, col. I with Smith, Are the State CourtsAnti-
Police?, L.A. Times, May 31, 1981, pt. IV, at 5, col. I. So politicized has use of the state
charter in California become that a state trial judge and a state government attorney have
gone on record as being hesitant to use the state constitution when, in their opinion, there is
a possibility that the public may respond by passing a contrary state constitutional amend-
ment. See Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, THE CENTER MAGAZINE,
Sept./Oct. 1981, at 6 (remarks in response to authors' paper). But what of the initiative and
referenda rights secured to the people of that state in article IV, section 22(a) of the Califor-
nia Constitution? So far as the amendment process is concerned, only at the state level can it
be said that there is a real and effective democratic check on the powers of the judicial and
legislative branches. (Compare the vastly more difficult process for amending the Federal
Constitution as set forth in article V with that of the California Constitution.) See Com-
ment, Judicial Review of Initiative ConstitutionalAmendments, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 461 (1980).
An instrumentalist approach, ever mindful of securing a particular political goal, may some-
times look to federal decisional law to uphold a given claim if reliance on state law may
result in the electorate's passing a contrary constitutional amendment. From this vantage
point, an instrumentalist approach is certainly antidemocratic.
63. Upon reflection, one may pause before applauding a few of the more recent "in-
dependent" decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Has this court pro-
ceeded with too much haste in turning to its state charter, perhaps by using the
Massachusetts Constitution in a reactionary fashion? Consider in this regard Moe v. Secre-
tary of Admin. & Fin., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 464, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981) (abortion funding);
District Attorney v. Watson, 80 Mass. 2331, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980) (death penalty).
64. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
65. Collins & Welsh, supra note 15, at 8, col. 3.
66. See People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 253-54, 578 P.2d 108, 122, 145 Cal. Rptr.
861, 875 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting).
67. Regrettably, Mr. Kamp's data concerning developments in shopping center con-
struction, location and function are dated. See Kamp, supra note 10, at 168-69 nn.13-22,
data otherwise available at the time when Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), was
decided. Cf. Friedman, No, All Shopping Centers Are Not Alike, Los ANGELES, Nov. 1979,
at 242, cited in Kamp, supra note 10, at 168 n. 18.
For a worthwhile discussion of some important social problems relating to new forms of
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whereby the state constitution is employed can be as important as the
result obtained in any constitutional struggle. That being the concep-
tual touchstone, Mr. Kamp does well when he speaks of future inde-
pendently based decisions that "will move the system of freedom of
expression into a new period of federalism in which state constitutional
guarantees of free speech play a role complementary to that of the First
Amendment."68 This hoped-for outcome presumes that state constitu-
tions will themselves be accorded independent importance.69
home ownership and land use, see Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94
HARV. L. REV. 647 (1981).
68. Kamp, supra note 10, at 188. "What is most needed is concentrated independent
thought on free expression problems. By turning their attention awayfrom federal doctrines
and by engaging in independent anaosis, state courts, through the interpretation of state con-
stitutions, could perform a valuable service in this area." Note, Freedom of Expression,
supra note 11, at 335 (emphasis added). This is well illustrated by a recent decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court, Hall v. May Dep't Stores, 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981) (puni-
tive damages for defamation of plaintifis person held prohibited by state constitution). If
read carefully, the Hall opinion has free speech implications far beyond the immediate con-
text in which the case presents itself. But that is a topic for a future article.
69. Given the current enthusiasm with federal decisional law-do lawyers still consult
the text of the Federal Constitution?-it is little wonder that both the state bench and bar
should be unfamiliar with their own charters. And when the constitutional text is consulted,
it is readily assumed in far too many cases that federal and state provisions are either identi-
cally worded or of identical force. Consider in this respect the situation of a North Carolina
trial judge: "A Superior Court judge issued a written apology Wednesday to the Times-
News of Burlington for forbidding it to publish information obtained from the personnel file
of a suspended elementary school principal.
"Judge D. March McLelland said that after studying the state constitution, which says
the press "shall never be restrained," he decided he had made a mistake in issuing a re-
straining order, and wanted to apologize.
"McLelland said he had assumed that the North Carolina Constitution contained a
provision on press freedom similar to the First Amendment ....
"The judge said, "Had [the state constitutional] provision been called to my attention or
had I looked it up when application for the order was made, it would not have been issued.
Had it been called to my attention or had I looked it up after issuance, it would have been
dissolved immediately." Charleston Daily Mail, May 21, 1981, pt. I, at p. 15A, col. 1. (I am
indebted to Professor Robert F. Williams of Rutgers-Camden Law School for calling this
news item to my attention.) The state trial judge's plight is a common one. That is, in the
majority of cases lawyers simply do not brief the law mandated by the state charter. When
this happens, it would be a salutary practice for judges, including state appellate judges, to
request supplemental briefing on the state law. See Welsh & Collins, supra note 27.
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